HOW BUDDHISM LOOKS AT PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS AND THEORIES

Y. KARUNADASA

Abstract: "The Buddha-Dhamma" = "What the Buddha Taught"= "Buddhism" is not a philosophy. It is a meta-philosophy, a philosophy that explains the very nature of philosophy. The final goal of Buddhism is not to have a view, or philosophy, but to view.

When it comes to philosophical speculations, Buddhism seeks to transcend them by identifying the deep seated psychological factors responsible for their emergence and prevalence in the world. This could be described as the "Buddhist Psychology of Philosophy". The premise for this is that our deep-seated desires and expectations have a direct impact on what we choose to believe in.

The best textual evidence for what we maintain here comes from the very First Buddhist Discourse in the very First Collection of Discourses of the Pali Buddhist Canon, called "The All-Embracing Net of Views" (Brahmajala Sutta). It mentions some sixty-two religious and philosophical views on the nature of the "self" (*atta*) and the "world" (*loka*). They all have as their epistemological ground "logic and pure reasoning" (*takka-vimamsa*), or experience gained through "mental concentration" (*ceto-samadhi*), or combination of both.[1]

The sixty-two views can be categorized as follows:

(a) Theism, the belief in a Creator God.

(b) Eternal-ism, the spiritual view that the physical body is perishable while the metaphysical self is eternal/immortal.

(c) Annihilation-ism, the materialist view that the self is the same as the physical body and, therefore, it is perishable at the time of death, with no possibility for its post-mortem existence.

(d) Cosmogony, whether the world is eternal or non-eternal in terms of time, or whether the world is finite or infinite in terms of space.

(e) Fortuitism, the view that the world has arisen haphazardly, without any rhyme or reason.

(f) Skepticism, the view that with our limited faculties we cannot fathom the unlimited reality, and therefore the need to suspend all assertive statements and categorical judgments.[2]

What is most significant about the Buddhist approach to the sixty-two views is that it is neither argumentative nor confrontational. In point of fact, not a single view is accepted as true, nor rejected as false. What we find here is a psychological diagnosis of how these views arise and why they persist in the world at large, and more importantly, how they can be transcended by identifying and eliminating their psychological roots.

Buddhism makes a distinction between two kinds of views. The first refers to the belief in a self or soul (*atta-vada*), considered as the unchanging essence of a human being. The second refers to all forms of "speculative metaphysics intended to explain the nature of the self" (*atta-vada-patisamyutta*) and "the nature of the world" (*loka-vada-patisamyutta*). Of these two kinds of views, the first is primary and the second derivative, because in the final analysis, it is the first that serves as a base for the emergence of the second. In other words, all varieties of speculative philosophy, whatever form they assume, are finally traceable to the belief in a permanent selfhood, the notion of a self-existent subject which is impervious to change.[3]

The idea of "self", as we all know, assumes many forms. It appears as "I" in ordinary discourse, as "soul" in religion, and as "ego" in philosophy. Whatever form it assumes, from the Buddhist point of view, it is a fallacious assumption, a conception without corresponding objective counterpart. What actually exists is not the self, but the view of the self. Its emergence is entirely due to psychological reasons.

This situation becomes clear from the Buddhist theory of cognition, that is, how we cognize mental and physical objects. According to one early Buddhist discourse, what we consider to be our apparently continuous psychological experience is analyzable into a series of discrete cognitive acts, or units of consciousness. Each cognitive act, in turn, consists of a number of cognitive events, such as sensory contact, feeling, perception, investigation, all leading up to a complex stage called "conceptual proliferation" (*papanca*). The cognitive events do not arise in the mind. They themselves are the mind.

The whole cognitive process is an entirely impersonal process. There is no self-entity behind the cognitive process that experiences the object. Nor is there an agent that directs the various mental activities. They take place naturally according to the principles of psychological order (*citta-niyama*), where each stage in the continuum is conditioned by the immediately preceding one.[4]

However, in every cognitive process of the unenlightened person, the latent tendency for the ego-consciousness awakens and gradually solidifies, eventually becoming fully crystallized at the final stage called conceptual proliferations (*papanca*). Once the ego-consciousness has arisen, it cannot exist in a vacuum. It needs ontological support. It needs concrete form and content. In this regard, the unenlightened person identifies the ego-consciousness with one or more of the five aggregates into which Buddhism analyzes the individual being, namely, corporeality, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness.

The process of identification takes the following form: "This is mine" (*etam mama*), "This I am (*eso ham asmi*), "This is my self" (*eso me atta*). This is how the notions of "my", "I', and "my own self" intrude into what otherwise is an impersonal and egoless congeries of mental and physical phenomena. Of these, the first is due to "craving" (*tanha*), the second to "conceit" (*mana*), and the third to "wrong view" (*ditthi)*. What is called "self-conceit" arises at a pre-rational level, whereas the idea of self, though conditioned by craving, arises at an elementary reflective level.[5]

The self-view is also called "the personality-view" (*sakkaya-ditthi*), because it affirms the presence of an abiding self in the psycho-physical organism, in one of twenty ways:

If “consciousness” (*vinnana*), for instance, is to be assumed as self, such an assumption could manifest itself in four ways: (1) consciousness is the same as self, as in the case of a flame of a lamp which is identical with its visual appearance, (2) the self possesses consciousness, just as a tree has a shadow, (3) consciousness is within the self, just as the scent is in the flower, (4) the self is in consciousness, just as a gem in a casket. This description is extended to the other four aggregates as well. Accordingly, there are in all twenty possible relations between the five aggregates and the hypothetical self. This is how Buddhism explains “the origin of the belief in a self-entity” (*sakkaya-ditthi-samudaya*).[6]

Once the belief in a self-entity has arisen, it becomes the base for a countless number of philosophical theories and speculations. Hence, we read in *Samyuttanikaya*, the Connected Discourses of the Buddha:

“Now, householder, as to those diverse views that arise in the world and as to these sixty-two views set forth in the Discourse on the All-Embracing Net of Views, it is owing to the self-view, that they arise and if the self-view exists not, they do not exist.” [7]

As the above quotation clearly shows, from the Buddhist perspective, all philosophical views that seek to explain the nature of the self and the world can be traced to the belief in a permanent individualized self.

According to the formula of Dependent Arising, there arise four kinds of grasping, due to craving. One of them is the “grasping of the self-notion” (*atta-vada-upadana*). Since the grasping of the self-notion is due to craving, it follows from the above reference that all philosophical views have craving as their generative base.[8]

The above statement is important from another aspect. There are two main interpretations as to why the Buddha deemed it necessary to observe silence on some ten questions. These questions relate to the nature of the world, whether it is eternal or non-eternal in terms of time, whether it is finite or infinite in terms of space, whether the life-principle and the physical body are identical or not, and whether the postmortem status of the Tathagata (the one who has attained enlightenment) is one of existence, or non-existence, or both existence and non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence. [9] Some have observed that if the Buddha did not answer these questions, it was because he did not know the answers to them. Some others have maintained that the Buddha’s silence was due to pragmatic reasons: That is, the Buddha knew the answers but for practical reasons he withheld them.[10]

These two explanations cannot be justified on textual and doctrinal evidence. As the above statement clearly indicates, if the Buddha observed silence on the ten questions, it was because they are all inappropriate questions. They are all based on the erroneous self-view, the view that there is an abiding self-entity within the constantly changing psychophysical organism.

As the early Buddhist discourses observe, the notion of the self has two varieties. One is the spiritualist version of the self. It is presented in the Buddhist texts as that which makes a clear distinction between a self-entity, on the one hand, and the physical body on the other. It thus assumes a duality between two basic principles, one spiritual and the other material; a permanent metaphysical self (soul), on the one hand, and the temporary physical body, on the other. Accordingly, a human being’s true essence is to be found, not in the perishable physical body, but in the permanent metaphysical self. Hence this theory

came to be presented in the Buddhist texts as "eternal-ism" (*sassatavada*), or the belief in an eternal self. Let us call this theory "the theory of the metaphysical self", while noting at the same time that all religions and philosophies that subscribe to it are, from the Buddhist point of view, different versions of eternal-ism.

The opposite view is the materialist version of the self. It sees itself as a reaction against the spiritualist view of the self. It is presented in the Buddhist texts as, that which asserts the complete identity of the self and the physical body. Accordingly, a human being's true essence is to be found, not in an elusive metaphysical principle, but in the empirically observable physical body. If the self and the physical body are identical, it logically and invariably follows that, with the breakup of the body at the time of death, the self itself comes to naught, to complete annihilation. Hence, this theory came to be presented in the Buddhist texts as "annihilation-ism" (*ucchedavada*), or the annihilationist theory of the self. Let us call this theory "the theory of the physical self", while noting at the same time that all materialist views that subscribe to it are, from the Buddhist perspective, different versions of annihilation-ism.

Buddhism presents the physical and the metaphysical versions of the self as occupying a position of binary opposition, while describing its own position as one that sets itself equally aloof from both of them. It is, in fact, against the background of these two views, that Buddhist teachings are often presented. The conclusion suggests itself, therefore, that from its very beginning Buddhism considered itself as a critical response to the mutual opposition between the spiritualist and the materialist ideologies.

These two views, according to the Buddha, prevail throughout the history of humankind's intellectual thought. Thus, addressing Kaccana, the Buddha says:

"This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends upon a duality – upon the notion of existence and the notion of non-existence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of non-existence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the cessation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom, there is no notion of existence in regard to the world. 'All exists', Kaccana, this is one extreme. 'All does not exist', this is the second extreme. Without veering towards either of these extremes, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the Middle." [11]

Here, the notions of existence and nonexistence mean the spiritualist and materialist views. For, these two are sometimes introduced as the "view of existence" (*bhava-ditthi*) and the "view of nonexistence" (*vibhava-ditthi*). As Buddhism understands, these two views are two versions of the self theory. The first is its metaphysical version and the second its physical version – a position of mutual exclusion to which the Buddha refers thus:

"Monks, there are these two views, the view of being and the view of non-being. Any recluses or Brahmins, who rely on the view of being, adopt the view of being, accept the view of being are opposed to the view of non-being. Any recluses or Brahmins, who rely on the view of non-being, adopt the view of non-being, accept the view of non-being are opposed to the view of being." [12]

According to Buddhism's diagnosis of spiritual eternal-ism (i.e., the belief in a permanent self-entity), its psychological origin can be traced to what is called "the craving for eternal life" (*bhava-tanha*), the desire for the immortality of the soul. It is the desire for the eternalization of the self, the desire to perpetuate individual existence into eternity. On the other hand, the psychological origin of materialism (i.e. the belief in a temporary self-entity) can be traced to "the craving for eternal death" (*vibhava-tanha*), the desire for self-annihilation after the time of death. It is the desire to see a complete annihilation of the individual existence at the time of death, without any prospect of postmortem survival.[13] What seems to be assumed here is that materialism resists the belief in survival because of its fear of moral retribution, for this view gives an open license to live our lives without being burdened by a sense of moral accountability.

The mutual opposition between spiritual eternal-ism and materialist annihilation-ism shows not only the perennial conflict between two mutually exclusive philosophical views, but also the human mind's oscillation between two deep-seated desires.

There is another important aspect of the Buddhist critique of views and ideologies: Buddhism does not endorse dogmatic adherence to views, even if they are right. To be infatuated with "the rightness" of one's own views and ideologies is called "*sanditthi-raga*". The dogmatic attachment to them is called "*ditthi-paramasa*". The root cause of both is the belief, "this alone is true and all else is false" (*idam eva saccam, mogham annam*). It is this kind of warped mind-set that provides a fertile ground for bigotry and dogmatism, what Buddhism calls "*idam-saccabhinivesa*".[14] Its external manifestations, as we all know, are acts of fanaticism and militant piety, indoctrination and unethical conversion, religious fundamentalism and persecution, not to speak of interpersonal conflicts and acts of terrorism often leading to internecine warfare.

From the Buddhist point of view, therefore, dogmatic attachment to views and ideologies is very much more detrimental and fraught with more danger than our greedy attachment to material objects. Inter-religious and intra-religious wars are a case in point. The cold war between capitalism and communism, which had nearly brought the world into the brink of nuclear disaster, is another case in point.

If Buddhism does not encourage dogmatic attachment to views, it is because from the Buddhist way of looking at it, a view is only a guide to action. In his well-known Discourse on the "Parable of the Raft" (*Kullupama*), the Buddha tells us that his teaching should be understood not as a goal unto itself but as a means for the realization of the goal. The teaching of the Buddha, as the Buddha himself says, has only relative value, relative to the realization of the goal. It is a thing to be used and not a thing to be ritually adulated. What this clearly implies is that even the right view, like all other views, is a conceptual model serving as a guide to action. If it is called right view, it is because it leads us directly to the right goal. The right goal according to Buddhism is a "right vision" (*samma dassana*) into the "nature of the world both within and outside us (*yathabhuta*).[15]

According to Buddhism, the world of conditioned experience (*samsara*) is a world of "construction" and "fabrication" (*samkhara*). Nibbana means its complete "de-construction" (*vi-samkhara*). Hence,

immediately after attaining Nibbana, the Buddha says: “My mind has come to a state of de-construction (*vi-samkhara-gatam cittam*); I have realized the ending of all craving (*tanhanam khayam ajjhaga)*.” [16]

Cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodha*) means cessation of craving (*tanha-nirodha*);

Cessation of craving means cessation of views (*ditthi-nirodha*)

Cessation of views means that the mind has come, not to “destruction”, but to “de-construction”. [17]

When the mind has reached de-construction, the five aggregates do remain. Yet they are no more constructed, no more appropriated in the sense the Tathagata does not impose on them any kind of craving or clinging.

That which is selfless, hard it is to see;

Not easy is it to perceive the truth

But who has ended craving utterly

Has naught to cling to, he alone can see. [18]

What takes place when Nibbana is realized is not a change in the nature of reality; it is a change in our perspective of the nature of reality. The fact of impermanence is not a problem in itself. It becomes a problem when it is wrongly perceived as permanence. This is what is called “perception of permanence in impermanence”. In the same way, the fact of non-self is not a problem in itself. It becomes a problem when it is wrongly perceived as self. This is what is called “perception of self in what is not the self”.[19]

What actually matters for Buddhism, is not the nature of the world per se, but the world as interpreted and constructed through the lens of our ego-centric perspectives: our views and beliefs, our speculative theories and dogmatic assertions. What comes to an end when Nibbana is realized , is not the nature of reality; rather it is a wrong interpretation of the nature of reality.

When Vacchagotta, the itinerant philosopher, asked the Buddha: “But has the Venerable Gotama a view of his own?” the Buddha replied: “The Tathagata, O Vaccha, has given up all views (*ditthi*). However, the Tathagata has viewed (*dittha*), thus: this is materiality, this is its arising, this is its cessation, this is feeling, this is perception, these are mental formations, and this is consciousness”. [20]

All speculative philosophies and metaphysical theories are ultimately due to the self-view. They all have the self as their point of view. If views are fabricated and proclaimed, it is because they satisfy our compulsive cravings and desires. This is the significance of the proposition “craving is a condition for clinging” in the formula of Dependent Arising.

As long as the self-view persists, as our ideational framework, there is the ingression of the ego-centric perspective into our perceptual experience. When we are conditioned by the ego-centric perspective, we see “what we desire to see”, “what we want to see”, not “what is actually there”.

The final conclusion that is thrust upon us is this: “What the Buddha taught” is not a philosophy. It is a meta-philosophy, a philosophy that explains the very nature of philosophy. Stated otherwise, the ultimate goal of Buddhism is “not to have a view”, but “to view”. “To view” means seeing clearly, without judging, editing, interpreting, rationalizing and justifying what comes to be observed. All forms of judging, editing, etc. involve grasping and clinging.

The main reason for this whole situation is the Buddhist doctrine of non-self, a doctrine that is unique to Buddhism. In point of fact, from its very beginning Buddhism was aware that this doctrine was not shared by any other contemporary religious or philosophical system. The Shorter Discourse on the Lion’s Roar of the Middle Length Sayings (*Majjhimanikaya*) says there are four kinds of clinging, clinging to sense pleasures, clinging to speculative views, clinging to rites and observances, and clinging to the notion of a truly existent self. The discourse goes on to say that there could be other religious teachers who would recognize some of the four kinds of clinging. However, what they cannot comprehend is the overcoming of the clinging to a doctrine of self. As clearly articulated here, the doctrine of non-self is the unique discovery of the Buddha. It is the crucial teaching that separates the Buddha’s teaching from all other religious and philosophical systems.

When it comes to other Buddhist teachings, the teachings on impermanence, suffering, kamma, rebirth (re-becoming), causality, and so forth we find Buddhism making reference to parallel teachings on the part of other religious teachers. However, what is most significant to note here is that when it comes to the doctrine of non-self, we do not find similar references to parallel doctrines. This also shows that the doctrine of non-self was not shared, in any form, by other religious teachers during the time of the Buddha.

The status of the doctrine of non-self as the most crucial doctrine that separates What the Buddha Taught from all other religions came to be recognized in the subsequent schools of Buddhist Thought as well. Acarya Yasomitra, a celebrity of the Sautrantika School of Buddhism, categorically asserts that in the whole world there is no other teacher who proclaims a doctrine of non-self. [21] Again, Acariya Buddhaghosa, the Theravadin commentator says that the characteristics of impermanence (*anicca)* and suffering (*dukkha*) are known whether Buddha’s arise or not, but that of non-self (*anatta*) is not known unless there is a Buddha; for the knowledge of it is the province of none but a Buddha. The Blessed One in some instances shows no-selfness through impermanence, in some through suffering, and in some through both. Why is that? While impermanence and suffering are both evident, non-self is not evident and appears impenetrable, hard to illustrate, and hard to describe. [22]

The doctrine of non-self, with some minor variations in interpretation, is commonly accepted by all Schools of Buddhist Thought that come under the three main Buddhist Traditions in the continent of Asia, namely, Theravada in the South, Mahayana in the East, and Vajrayana in the North, and it is on this basis, therefore, that we can speak of the transcendental unity of Buddhism.

What is most radical about the Buddhist doctrine of non-self is that it is through this doctrine that Buddhism sets itself equally aloof from the two perennial world views of spiritual eternal-ism (*sassatavada*) and materialist annihilation-ism (*ucchedavada*). The doctrine of non-self provides a new

dimension to the concept of human personality and lays the foundation for a psychology without the "psyche", if by "psyche" is understood a self-subsisting entity within the recesses of our mind. As Edward Conze observes, the specific contribution of Buddhism to religious thought lies in its insistence on the doctrine of non-self. [23]

If Buddhist psychology shows how the notion of self arises, Buddhist ethics shows how it can be got rid of, Buddhism's highest spiritual goal, which is Nibbana, shows the final state where it is completely eliminated.

If Buddhism does not recognize the 'self-notion' under any guise, this could be attributed to how Buddhism understands the nature meditative experience, that is, concentration or unification of the differentiated mind.

There are two kinds of meditative experience. One is *samatha* and the other *vipassana. Samatha* meditation was practiced by pre-Buddhist Brahmanical schools of meditation as well. On the other hand*, vipassana* meditation is the unique discovery of the Buddha.

In a general sense, "*samatha*" means the unification of the differentiated mind. In a technical sense, it means one-pointed-ness of mind (*cittassa ekaggata*), which is experienced at the higher reaches of mind in the ascending levels of Jhanic experience. In pre-Buddhist meditative praxis, *samatha* was considered as an end in itself, as the final goal of religious life. However, according to the Buddha, *samatha* meditation is only a means to an end, the end being the realization of wisdom. For, although samatha meditation stills the turbulent mind, it cannot remove "the sediments" of moral evil lying below the level of surface consciousness.

From the Buddhist perspective, exclusive emphasis on *samatha* meditation can have many dangers. One such danger is the possibility of wrongly interpreting such meditative experience in the light of theological and metaphysical speculations. As the Venerable Bhikkhu Nyanatiloka observes:

A fertile soil for the origin and persistence of beliefs and ideas about a self, soul, god or any other form of an absolute entity is misinterpreted meditative experience occurring in devotional rapture or mystical trance. Such experience is generally interpreted by the mystic or theologian as revelation of, or union with, a godhead; or it is taken for a manifestation of man's true and eternal Self [24]

Vipassana means "seeing clearly" or "seeing accurately". As to the content or object of this kind of seeing, the Buddha himself gives the answer: To the question raised by the Buddha, "what, monks, are the things that should be thoroughly comprehended through higher knowledge or insight", the Buddha himself provides the answer: "It is the five aggregates of grasping, so should the question be answered".[25] The five aggregates of grasping are corporeality (*rupa*), feelings (*vedana),* perceptions (*sanna*), volitional constructions (*samkhara*), and consciousness (*vinnana*). It is these five aggregates of grasping that constitute the whole of the phenomenology of experience. Therefore, according to the Buddha, the highest insight is not the knowledge of some kind of transcendental reality, as for instance the Cosmic Soul of the pre-Buddhist Upanisadic thought. Rather, it is the final awakening to the actual nature of the world of phenomenal existence.

From the Buddhist perspective, impermanence (*anicca*), un-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*), and non-self (*anatta*) characterize the actual nature of phenomenal existence. Therefore vipassana or insight-meditation is the direct perception of phenomena in terms of impermanence, un-satisfactoriness, and non-self.

For Buddhism, jhana or meditational experience (*samatha:* concentration or unification of mind) is not emancipation, but is only a means to emancipation. This is precisely why the Buddha-to-be was not satisfied with the meditational practices taught to him by Alara, the Kalama, and Uddaka, the disciple of Rama. According to their assessment, concentration or unification of mind, that is, what corresponds to jhana in Buddhism is the final goal of religious life. This is precisely why, as mentioned in the Brahmajala Sutta, some non-Buddhist teachers believed that the attainment of jhana is "the attainment of Nibbana in this very life" (*dittha-dhamma-nibbana*).[26]

Buddhism does not interpret jhana experience as the final emancipation, as shown by a Buddhist discourse where the Venerable Sariputta analyzes its content. Here the content of each jhana is fully itemized, without leaving any residue for any kind of mystical interpretation. What is significant is the observation made that the mental factors of each jhana are said to arise in full awareness of the meditator: "He is fully aware of their arising, their persistence, and their passing away." Then he comes to the conclusion that these mental factors, having not been, come to be (*ahutva sambhonti*), and, having been, they pass away (*hutva pativenti*)". It is further observed that since the Venerable Sariputta fully comprehends the constituents of each jhanic experience, he does not get attracted by them nor does he get repelled by them, nor does he get attached to them, or infatuated by them. Without getting overwhelmed by them, he comes to the conclusion that emancipation is higher than that (*atthi uttarim nissaranan ti pajanati*). [27]

This account of the nature of jhana experience establishes three basic facts: One is that its content can be fully analyzed without leaving any residue. The second is that its constituents arise and vanish in full knowledge of the meditator. The third is the fact that it does not in itself constitute final emancipation. For, according to Buddhism, the jhana experience too is impermanent *(anicca),* unsatisfactory *(dukkha*) and devoid of a self (*anatta*), conditioned (*sankha*ta), and dependently arisen (*paticcasamuppanna)*. In point of fact, Buddhism seems to be fully aware of the possibility of misinterpreting jhanic experience on the basis of theological or metaphysical theories. This seems to be the reason why the meditator is advised to review the content of jhanic experience in the light of the three marks of phenomenal existence (*tilakkhana*), i.e., as impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*) and, as devoid of a self-subsisting entity (*anatta*).

NOTE: The term "*ditthi*" occurs very often in the early Buddhist discourses. It is only by examining their contextual usages, that we can understand their minor differences of nuance. Cf. "*samma ditthi*" = "right view" as opposed to "*miccha ditthi*" = "wrong view". It is in respect of one kind of theoretical view that the term "wrong" or "false" (*miccha*) is used, namely, "There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world, no other world; no mother, no

father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and Brahmins in the world who have themselves realized by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world" (Majjhimanikaya PTS, I. 515). The "wrong view" described here has four main ingredients: (a) denial of the distinction between 'what is' and 'what ought to be', (b) denial of moral causation, (c) denial of post-mortem survival, and (d) denial of the possibility of spiritual life. If the Buddha describes this view as "distorted" and "false", it is because it leads to the collapse of the moral foundation of society, thereby destroying the possibility for the practice of all religious life (*brahmacariyavasa*), whether it is Buddhist or not. The wrong view, referred to here, has the following four sub-divisions: (a) materialistic annihilation-ism (*ucchedavada*) that reduces everything to matter; (b) moral non-consequential-ism that denies any correlation between the act and its results (*akiriysvada*); (c) moral non-causation-ism (ahetukavada), which asserts that everything happens fortuitously; (d) and fatalism, which denies the effects of all human effort ("akiriyavada"). Cf. also "*ditthi-sampanna*" = "endowed with right view" (Samyuttanikaya PTS, II 43, 58, 80); "*ditthippatta* = "endowed with insight"; "*bhaddika ditthi*" = "auspicious view" (Anguttaranikaya PTS, V, 212), "*ujuka ditthi*" = "direct view" (Samyuttanikaya PTS, V 143, 165), "*ujugata ditthi*" = "straightforward view" (Majjhimanikaya PTS, I 46); "*ditthi-visuddhi*" = "purity of views" (Anguttaranikaya PTS,I 95; Majjhimanikaya PTS, I, 147).

1 Brahmajala Sutta, Dighanikaya.

2 Ibid loc. cit.

3 Cf. Tanhapaccaya upadanam in Dependent Arising.

4. Madhupindika Sutta in Majjhimanikaya.

5 Ibid loc.cit.

6 See Ven. Nanamoli Thera, "Anatta" according to the Theravada: The Three Basic Facts of Existence, III: p 86, BPS. Kandy.

7 Samyuttanikaya (PTS) IV, 526.

8 Cf. Tanha-paccaya upadanam in Dependent Arising.

9 Majjhimanikaya (PTS) I, 427, 485 ff.

10 See K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, London, 1963, 470 ff.

11 Majjhimanikaya (PTS) I, 65.

12 Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, 160 (Majjhimanikaya PTS I, 65).

13 See e.g. Dighanikaya (PTS) III, 212, 216; Samyuttanikaya (PTS), V 432.

14 Suttanipata, gatha 895; Majjhimanikaya (PTS), II, 171; Dhammasangani (PTS), 1498.

15 See e.g. Dighanikaya (PTS) I, 83.

16 Suttanipata, gatha 144; Patisambhidamagga (PTS) II, 63; Visuddhimagga (PTS), 605.

17 Dhammapada, gatha 154.

18 Samyuttanikaya (PTS), IV, 27.

19 Anguttaranikaya (PTS), II, 52; Nettippakarana (PTS) 85.

20 Majjhimanikaya (PTS), I 487.

21 Abhidharmakosa-vyakhya of Yasomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, 1932-36, p. 697.

22 Vibhangatthakatha (PTS), 49-50.

23 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, London, 1962.

24 Buddhism and the God-Idea, Vision of Dhamma: Buddhist Writings of Nyanaponika Thera, ed. Bhikkhu Bodhi, BPS, Kandy, p. 12, Kandy, 1994.

25 Samyuttanikaya (PTS) III 83-4

26 Brahmajala Sutta, Dighanikaya (PTS).

27 See Anupada Sutta, Majjhimanikaya (PTS).